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Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case




Crushed by an Anvil leaves the reader, like the Kilwa victims, feeling
rather defeated. Author Adam McBeth uses the Anvil Mining example to
show that existing dispute resolution mechanisms are inadequate to
resolve conflicts related to increasing foreign investment by multinational
enterprises. His description of each forum's refusal to provide redress
offers insight into the political motivations underlying each decision,
though the analysis fails to offer a solution to the forum-less victims.
McBeth examines the ways that various adjudicatory bodies have declined
to exercise jurisdiction, but he has not adequately addressed the question
of which body should decide these claims.
In looking at soft law corporate accountability mechanisms, McBeth
finds the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's (MIGA)
performance standards (the Voluntary Principles) "toothless" and
ineffective, lacking clear rules, reporting requirements, and enforcement
mechanisms.' While this conclusion may be warranted, his finding of
inadequacy cannot be the end of the inquiry. This response argues that
appropriate recourse may be found by looking to the entities that make this
unique, transnational interaction possible. Put simply, non-state actors like
the World Bank Group (WBG) play a significant role in creating the
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international alliances and disputes that necessitate the development of
international law. As facilitators and beneficiaries of these interactions,
these entities have a duty to ensure that the parties involved have access to
international law.
Admittedly, existing soft law mechanisms are ineffective, largely due to
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. However, I argue that
converting voluntary behavioral standards into threshold terms of
investment contracts would be an appropriate and effective way to hold
multinational corporations liable for transnational activities. The WBG
could allow the community to participate in enforcement by incorporating
transparency and accountability into their own structure by insisting on
informed, prior consent, clear guidelines of conduct, public access to
records, and systems of redress that are accessible to the community.
Contracts between MIGA and investors need to: (1) allow for the national
government and the affected community to have input in creating social
responsibility standards; and (2) make the standards threshold contractual
conditions. To make these provisions effective, all parties involved,
including the local community, investors, and MIGA, need reliable
enforcement mechanisms. Restructuring the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) procedure to make it accessible
to the public would better protect community interest as well as investor
interest and align the forum with World Bank goals of positive and
sustainable development.
II. THE WORLD BANK IS THE APPROPRIATE ADJUDICATORY BODY
In the past decade, the WBG has expanded its role in arranging
transactions within the extractive industry, describing their role in these
investments as a transnational point person. A 2003 internal review
describes the "heavy demands" placed on national governments by
extractive industry investment. Governments must manage "multiple and
wide-ranging impacts of oil, gas, and mining projects on the economy, the
social fabric, and the environment." 2 Often governments lack the capacity,
resources, experience, and skills to respond to the situation and effectively
negotiate with potential investors, making the WBG "potentially vitally
important to these countries in providing wise counsel, technical
assistance, and financial support."3 Drawing upon intergovernmental
contacts, influence, and expertise to help national governments balance
divergent interests, the World Bank provides logistical support and
assurances that "extractive industries projects [will] contribute to poverty
alleviation and sustainable development."4 MIGA provides non-economic
2. 3 EMIL SALIM, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW 103 (2003).
3. Id.
4. 1 EMIL SALIM, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE
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support through logistical support, technical advice, and the image of
legitimacy underlying WBG initiatives. MIGA's extractive industry
investments are aimed at stimulating economic development and reducing
poverty by creating: (1) legal and fiscal frameworks to attract private
mining investment, (2) social and environmental frameworks for
responsible mining, and (3) reform and capacity building for government
agencies and ministries.5 In arranging investments, the World Bank is seen
as a comprehensive international body, equipped and adept at establishing
stable investments in risky and potentially crisis-prone situations. This
comprehensive system, including safeguards, performance standards, and
a framework for dispute resolution, gives both investors and the local
community a degree of reassurance that the World Bank is capable of
managing the situation. Therefore, when Anvil CEO Bill Turner admitted
that he did not understand the Voluntary Principles and MIGA responded
by approving the contract, it seems reasonable for Anvil to conclude, as
McBeth does, that the Voluntary Principles are mere "lip service." 6 If
MIGA, acting as project counsel and risk guarantor, does not consider the
Voluntary Principles to merit further explanation, it follows that the
contracting party would not consider them critical terms of the contract.
MIGA's character as the informed expert arranging these transactions
means that others will rely on this knowledge. MIGA's subsequent
dismissal of their own performance standards may well be seen as a causal
root of Anvil's disastrous response to a reasonably foreseeable situation.
MIGA arranges for loans and insures the project against risk, providing
vital support that gives the agency substantial pre-contract leverage to
make responsible corporate behavior a binding condition of the agreement.
McBeth acknowledges that the WBG has "accepted the legitimacy of
imposing conditions on its lending" to foster local development, 7 but finds
MIGA interest in enforcing these conditions insufficient to offer any real
accountability. If, however, it is unrealistic to expect MIGA to enforce
these contractual terms, one alternative might be to restructure the initial
agreement to give local parties affected an interest that is actionable in
WBG arbitration.
MIGA and the foreign investor act jointly to bring about this venture
for mutual benefit and thus jointly bear some responsibility to the local
community for the consequences of their action or project. It is difficult to
deny that, but for the assistance of the World Bank, Anvil Mining would
not have lent its logistical support to the Congolese military - both because
World Bank involvement was integral in orchestrating the investment and
because the World Bank's self-styling as such allows for investors to follow
their lead in regard to international conduct. Press from Anvil Mining and
INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIE REVIEW 25 (2003).
5. 3 SALIM, supra note 2, at 104.
6. McBeth, supra note 1, at 161.
7. Id. at 160.
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the WBG demonstrates that, without MIGA's support in negotiations and
securing insurance for high-risk enterprises, Anvil would not have been
able to secure the capital to invest in the Dikulushi mine,8 and describes the
Anvil-MIGA relationship as "partners in development."9 Characterizing
MIGA's support as "represent[ing] a very effective way of mitigating the
political risk associated with operating in the DRC,"10 Anvil's public
statement evidences the significant non-economic reliance on World Bank
expertise underlying these partnerships. Without effective corporate
responsibility built into the initial project design, the WBG risks facilitating
transactions between a dangerously underinformed investor and an
economically disadvantaged nation state.
III. EXISTING WORLD BANK MECHANISMS Do NOT FUNCTION TO AUGMENT
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
McBeth rightly finds that existing dispute resolution mechanisms
become important when corporations fail to comply with social
responsibility policies and the local community has no recourse. The Anvil
analysis would benefit from recognizing that publicly-advocated,
unenforced investor responsibility practices actually produce a detrimental
effect, as "[g]rand words are counterproductive when they create the
illusion that effective action is being taken.""
By publicly adopting the Voluntary Principles, MIGA and the investor
convey assurances of a stronger commitment than either will assume. The
WBG final report concludes that, "rather than helping to internalize social
and environmental costs, the Safeguard Policies often serve the interest of
extractive industry companies in acquiring 'creditworthiness' for project
financing," 12 revealing one reason why situations like the Anvil disaster are
a common consequence of "socially responsible" ventures in the extractive
industry. The Kilwa incident that forms the centerpiece of McBeth's Article
was one of eighty-five incidents of human rights abuse related to foreign
investments in the extractive industry in the DRC alone.13 A 2003 internal
8. See Press Release, Anvil Mining Ltd., Anvil Mining Limited Secures Political Risk
Insurance from World Bank Agency for Mine in the DRC (May 4, 2005); Press Release, MIGA,
MIGA Insures Copper and Silver Mine in the Democratic Republic of Congro (May 3, 2005),
both available at http://www.anvilmining.com/files/
2005May04MIGAPoliticalRisklnsurance.pdf (reporting that MIGA made the Dikulushi
investment possible by providing $13.3 million in guarantee coverage).
9. Anvil Mining Ltd., supra note 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Bill Turner, Anvil President
and CEO).
10. Id.
11. David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking
Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 595, 658 (2006).
12. 2 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW, WORLD BANK GROUP, STRIKING A BETER BALANCE:
THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ExTRAcTIVE
INDUSTRIES REVIEW 25 (2003).
13. Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General to Martin Belinga-Aboutou,
President, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002). 4
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review of extractive industry project implementation found
only 41 percent of the projects in the sample . . . had
adequately supervised and reported the implementation of
safeguard policies .... These issues are important since they
account for the entire slippage in the projects' consistency
with safeguards from the approval to the implementation
stage.14
Anvil CEO Bill Turner's admitted poor understanding of the Safeguard
Policies demonstrates that, even at the approval stage, there was little
reason for either party to believe that these policies would be internalized
in the implementation stage. The internal review further found that
projects had inadequate "monitoring and evaluation of safeguard
compliance 'on-site,' which was effectively implemented in only about 33
percent of the projects reviewed." 15 This industry-wide review indicates
that Safeguard Policies are not being voluntarily followed and bolsters the
assertion that voluntary principles are "an impossible dream." 16
Corporate non-compliance with standards of socially responsible
conduct creates financial and social costs that frustrate the system and
could ultimately discourage transnational investment. "This weakness in
the compliance oversight and supervision system, if allowed to persist, can
lead to substantial and costly failures for the borrower as well as the
Bank." 17 Internal review findings suggest that, even without considering
social or environmental damage, corporate misconduct could present
unforeseen additional costs to the contracting parties and threaten the
sustainability of these fledgling enterprises. "Without some international
legal standards, we will likely continue to witness both excessive claims
made against [corporations] for their responsibility and counterclaims by
corporate actors against such accountability. " 18 In the Anvil case, for
example, if the Kilwa victims had litigated their claims and received
damages in an Australian or Canadian court, Anvil's costs could have
exceeded their net earnings for the following year.19 Without a clear code of
conduct and forum choice, parties will be unable to predict or internalize
potential litigation costs, leaving each party vulnerable to losing more
resources than they initially expected to gain.
14. 2 SALIM, supra note 12, at 34.
15. Id.
16. Barnhizer, supra note 11, at 605.
17. 2 SALIM, supra note 12, at 34.
18. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L. J. 448 (2001).
19. See ANVIL MINING LTD., ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
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IV. WORLD BANK FORUMS SHOULD ALLOW LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO
SANCTION CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
McBeth evinces little hope for soft law accountability, concluding with
the dismissive, "[1]ike all safeguards, the value of safeguards imposed by
MIGA and other World Bank agencies is only as great as the interests they
aim to protect and the manner of their implementation and enforcement." 20
Yet attempted litigation on behalf of the Kilwa victims shows substantial
promise, and shortcomings in enforcement are not reason enough to
dismiss World Bank forums entirely. MIGA's failure to demand
responsible corporate conduct compels the question of who will make
corporate compliance a priority and how to give them the tools to act on
this interest.
The CAO, various NGOs, and governments have recognized that the
World Bank bears some responsibility for damage resulting from their
projects. 21 By incorporating local actors and the Voluntary Principles as
integral parts of the contract, the WBG could, at minimum, design the
contract so that it is clear that the investor has a duty to comply with social
responsibility standards. Corporate failure to voluntarily apply the
policies indicates that effective implementation requires explicit and
binding codes of conduct. Without imposing "real law" and monetary
consequences, corporate actors will not be sufficiently motivated to take
necessary steps to ensure successful social responsibility enterprises. 22
Traditionally, liability is viewed as emanating from the loci of injury. In
the case of Anvil Mining, however, the local employees most directly
involved in the disaster were far removed from Anvil's corporate office
that knew (or should have known) of the responsibility to comport with
the Voluntary Principles. Concretizing socially responsible practices as
threshold terms would alert corporate officers at the highest level of
decision-making that liability may be assessed from the top-down.
The multi-tiered structure of multinational corporations places many
levels of separation between the decision to act and the actor, making it
difficult to assign liability. In order to retain the deterrent effect of liability
rules, transnational litigation will need to consider a conception of
corporate harm that is located at the site of ultimate decision-making as
opposed to the site where the injury is felt. Research has demonstrated
compelling economic justification for focusing liability for corporate
irresponsibility upon individuals with the greatest monitoring ability. 23
Top-centric liability schemes have resulted in cost minimizing behavior in
both business entities and bureaucracies, 24 suggesting that a stronger threat
20. McBeth, supra note 162.
21. Id. at 159.
22. Barnhizer, supra note 11, at 659.
23. Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual
Responsibility Under International Law, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72,82 (2007).
24. Id. at 89.
[Vol. 11
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of liability may provide the necessary incentive for successfully avoiding
complicity in human rights abuses. Assessing fault from the top down
would incentivize decision-makers at the highest level of the company to
impose a trickle-down chain of compliance with duties to monitor and
safeguard.
Including compliance with the Voluntary Principles as a covenant in a
MIGA contract sets the groundwork for enforcement, but, as McBeth
points out, "such a sanction is only as effective as the enthusiasm of MIGA
to enforce it."25 MIGA may have little incentive to bring suit against
delinquent corporations, but their responsibility to foster positive
development should, at minimum, require them to enable local actors to
sanction misconduct. Investigatory bodies have repeatedly called for
increased local involvement at the project outset and more effective
safeguards to ensure responsible corporate conduct. Incorporating local
community and government participation into the initial project design
would better inform all parties to the agreement about the scope and
potential pitfalls of the venture. Local actors would be able to provide
cultural, geographical, and political context that would help MIGA and the
corporation create realistic project plans that are less likely to frustrate
cultural or political sensitivities.
Models to encourage community participation at the project outset
have become increasingly accepted, but are rendered ineffective when the
agreed-upon standards are not practiced. Host nations cannot be relied on
to protect community interest, as prosecuting human rights violations may
conflict with government interest in encouraging investment or reveal their
own complicity breaching socially responsible standards. 2 6 If the role of
the corporate actor were an explicit contract term, local community and
government would be able to reference the written agreement when
seeking arbitration.
Even if the terms of MIGA-investor contracts were expanded to
accommodate third-party claims however, existing arbitration procedure
renders the forum inaccessible to the public. The adjudicatory body of the
World Bank Group, ICSID, arbitrates legal disputes arising from
international investments between bodies of member states. ICSID is well-
adapted for transnational business, as its decisions are binding on domestic
national courts of all member countries, a pre-condition of ICSID
membership that removes difficulties associated with personal jurisdiction
or executing judgments. Another precondition of ICSID membership is
that states must consent to ICSID judgment as an "exclusive remedy,"
which decreases the diplomatic difficulties associated with concurrent
litigation or judgments. In Anvil's case, for example, an ICSID arbitration
would resolve the Australian court's reluctance to rule in contradiction to
25. McBeth, supra note 1, at 162.
26. Ratner, supra note 18, at 461. 7
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the Congolese Court.27 Furthermore, this ICSID decision would be
enforceable in either the Congo or Australia.28
Existing ICSID procedure would preclude suit by Anvil victims and
should be made accessible to a wider range of parties to MIGA
investments. ICSID arbitration is available only to the contracting parties
and requires a substantial up-front fee.29 Member governments have, on
occasion, invoked ICSID arbitration to remedy human rights abuses, but
when national and community interests diverge (as in this case), citizens
are left without recourse. The cost of ICSID proceedings, borne by the
disputing parties, would be prohibitively expensive to most private
citizens, and will have to be reassessed in order to offer real access to
ICSID. Initial requests for arbitration cost U.S. $ 25,000, which is far from
the total costs of the proceeding, and forecloses claims from most private
individuals and many poorer governments. 30 The forum's non-disclosure
policy pertaining to written opinions, arbitral awards, and third party
presence at hearings presents yet another barrier to community
participation. Recent requests for citizen participation in investor-state
arbitration have been denied.31 A 2004 discussion paper released by the
ICSID Secretariat claims to have improved transparency by publishing
awards, "or at least their key legal holdings." 32 Nonetheless, human rights
groups criticize ICSID for deferring to the non-disclosure preferences of
private parties, even when the dispute has far-reaching implications for
social or environmental welfare of the local community.33
If the MIGA is to align with its own standards of social responsibility,
dispute resolution proceedings need to be available to the public and
transparent. Opening ICSID as a public forum would be more resonant
with WBG's development goals and would subject corporations to public
scrutiny, allowing the international community to condition consumer
choice on socially responsible behavior. If the World Bank posits itself as
committed to sustainable development and continues to orchestrate
multinational economic relationships, it must take steps to allow the
parties to engage as equals.
27. McBeth, supra note 1, at 147-48.
28. This decision may not be enforceable in Canada, which has signed but not ratified the
ICSID Covenant. See ICSID, List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the
Convention, ICSID/3 (Nov. 4, 2007), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Con
tractingStates&ReqFrom=Main.
29. ICSID, SCHEDULE OF FEES 1 (2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet (follow hyperlink for "Schedule of Fees"; the follow hyperlink "PDF").
30. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Aug. 30, 2005, Latest Developments in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, 8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IlT/2005/2 (2005).
31. SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, INST. FOR POL'Y STUD., CHALLENGING CORPORATE
INVESTOR RULE 18 (2007), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/#139 (describing denial
of community participation in Betchel v. Bolivia).
32. ICSID, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION
DISCUSSION PAPER 8 (2004).
33. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 31, at 8.
[Vol. 11
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V. CONCLUSION
Using the Anvil case study to look at existing forums to see which, if
any, may agree to adjudicate seems a bit beside the point, as each new case
would require another searching and costly forum search. Crushed by an
Anvil's description of the various fora brings to light commonalities within
the policy concerns of various national courts and ultimately demonstrates
the need for an independent adjudicator. The Article's conclusion that
existing independent arbitration mechanisms are inadequate is not a
satisfactory conclusion, but may provide the context to explore solutions to
the Anvil problem. Given that, in the past two decades, the development
of international law has been increasingly informed by the activity of non-
state entities,34 it seems that the dispute resolution mechanisms used by
these same entities is a likely starting point for a broader transnational
adjudication system. ICSID has the potential to be an effective tool to
protect communities affected by El investment, but it must relinquish some
investor-focused procedure to offer truly accessible arbitration.
34. E.g., Simon Chesterman, Oil and Water: Regulating the Behavior of Multinational
Corporations Through Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 309 (2004) (discussing different efforts
to theorize the place of multinational corporations in the international order).
2008]
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